China’s Xinjiang: ‘Ethnic tensions and economic disparity’…

XINJIANG REGION

From the desk of MD

THE Xinjiang Uighur Region (XUAR), a vast land mass and territory in western China, accounts for one-sixth of China’s land and is home to around 20-million people from thirteen major ethnic groups. The largest of these groups is the Uighurs, a predominately Muslim community with close ties to central Asia. Some Uighurs (pronounced: WEE-gurs) call China’s presence in Xinjiang a form of imperialism, and they steeped up calls in the 1990s, sometimes violently, for independence, through separatist groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. The Chinese government reacted, spontaneously, by promoting the migration of China’s ethnic majority, the Han, to Xinjiang. Beijing has also strengthened economic ties with the area and has tried on numerous occasions to cut-off potential sources of separatist support from neighbouring states that are linguistically and ethically linked with the Uighurs.

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Since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, Xinjiang has experienced varying degrees of autonomy. Turkic rebels in Xinjiang, for instance, declared independence in October 1933 and created the Islamic Republic of East Turkestan. The following year, though, the Republic of China reabsorbed the region. In 1944, factions within Xinjiang again declared independence, this time under the auspices of the Soviet Union, and created what became known as the Second East Turkistan Republic. But in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party took over the territory and declared it a Chinese province. In October 1955, Xinjiang became classified as an “autonomous region” of the People’s Republic of China.

Some Uighurs, particularly those that reflect over Xinjiang’s intermittent periods of independence, call for the creation of a Uighur state. The Central Asian Uighurs know a great deal about the two East Turkestan periods of sovereign rule, and they are known to reflect on that quite frequently. Many of these Uighurs say China colonised the area in 1949. But in its first white paper on Xinjiang, the Chinese government said Xinjiang had been an “inseparable part” of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation since the Western Han Dynasty, which ruled from 206 BC to 24 AD.

Xinjiang’s wealth undoubtedly hinges on its vast mineral and oil deposits. In the early 1990s, Beijing decided to spur Xinjiang’s growth by granting it special economic zones, heavily subsidised local cotton farmers, and overhauled its tax system. In August 1991, the Xinjiang government launched the Tarim Basin Project to stimulate agricultural output. During this period, Beijing invested in the region’s infrastructure, built massive projects like the Tarim Desert Highway and a rail link to western Xinjiang. A strongly held belief is that these projects were designed to bind Xinjiang more closely to the PRC (Republic of China).

Since 1954, China has also used the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) to build agricultural settlements in China’s western periphery. Known locally as the Bingtuan, the XPCC is charged with cultivating and guarding the Chinese frontier. In an attempt to fulfil this mission, the corps has its own security organs, including an armed police force and government militia. Over the past half-century, the XPCC has attracted a steady stream of migrant workers to Xinjiang.

Map of China indicating the geo location of Xinjiang, the western region of China, where ethnic tensions are running high. (Map/Image Credit: Economist)

Beijing has continued to develop Xinjiang. Programs such as “Open up the West” and “Go West” have made the region relatively prosperous. The general per capita income of Xinjiang as a region, for instance, is higher than all of China’s except for the southeast coast. Others note, though, that Xinjiang’s wealth is concentrated in its oil-rich centres, and within international development bodies like the Asian Development Bank. Analysts often point to high levels of inequality in the area; such citations are applicable – the Chinese government having launched a series of programs to alleviate poverty in Xinjiang, and in March 2008, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasised “harmonious development” of the region in a government report.

To understand why China’s Xinjiang has spiralled out of control, a number of factors require to be considered:

 

HAN MIGRATION

A growing job market in Xinjiang has lured a steady stream of migrant workers to the region in pursuit of employment and opportunity, many of whom are ethnically Han. The Chinese government does not count the number of workers that travel to Xinjiang, but analysts say the local Han population has risen from around 5% in the 1940s to approximately 40% today. These migrants work in various industries, both low and high tech, and have certainly helped to transform Xinjiang’s landscape. In June 2008, the BBC produced a report called “Life in Urmqi” which said that Xinjiang’s capital had recently witnessed:

… The arrival of shopping centres, tower blocks, department stores and highways.

Many of these Uighurs say China colonised the area in 1949. But, in its first white paper on Xinjiang, the Chinese government said Xinjiang had been an “inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation” since the Western Han Dynasty.

In its 2007 annual report to the U.S. Congress, the Congressional Executive Commission on China said the Chinese government “provides incentives for migration to the region from elsewhere in China, in the name of recruiting talent and promoting stability.” Since imperial times, the Chinese government has tried to settle Han on the outskirts of China to integrate the Chinese periphery. The Communist Party, however, says its policies in Xinjiang are primarily designed to promote economic development, not demographic change. The influx of migrants into Xinjiang has fuelled Uighur discontent as Han and Uighurs compete over jobs and natural resources.

 

ETHNIC TENSION

The Government of China says that Xinjiang is home to thirteen major ethnic groups. The largest, the Uighurs, comprise 45% of Xinjiang’s population, according to the census of 2003. Like many of these groups, the Uighurs are predominately Muslim and have cultural ties to Central Asia.

As ethnic Hans flood into Xinjiang, many Uighurs resent the strain they place on scarce and limited resources like land and water. In 2006, Human Rights in China said population growth in Xinjiang had transformed the local environment, leading to a reduced human access to clean water and fertile soil for drinking, irrigation and agriculture.

Ethnic tension is fanned by economic disparity: the Han tend to be wealthier and more affluent than the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Some evidence suggests that the wage-gap is the result of discriminatory hiring practices. Han applications tend to have better professional networks and contacts: they are generally more influential, children of elite Party members and government leaders. The cultural level and educational standards of the Uighurs in Xinjiang is deemed quite low.

More broadly, Uighers are frequently being frustrated by what they consider to be Chinese attempts to refashion their cultural and religious identity. Often, Uighur’s (living) in exile are known to condemn China for its fierce repression of religious expression and its intolerance for any expression of discontent. Beijing responds to these accusations by saying they respect China’s ethnic minorities, and point to how the Government of China have improved the quality of life for Uighurs by raising economic, public health, and educational levels in Xinjiang.

This month, ethnic tensions between the Han and Uighur communities in Xinjiang was brought into the international limelight after severe riots between the two groups and police forces erupted in the province’s capital city of Urumqi. According to Chinese state media, at least 150 people were killed, and more than 800 were injured. The riots were reportedly sparked by a Uighur protest over the ethnically motivated killing of two Uighur workers in the southern province of Guangdong. Accounts of how the protest turned violent differ.

 

TERRORISM & COUNTERINSURGENCY

During the 1990s, separatist movements in Xinjiang began frequent attacks against the Chinese government. The most prominent of these was the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). China, the United States, and the United Nations Security Council have all deemed ETIM a terrorist organisation, and China has said that the group has ties to al-Qaeda.

 

CONCERN about Uighur terrorism flared in August 2008, just prior to the Beijing Olympics, when two men attacked a military police unit in Xinjiang, killing sixteen. Later, according to the New York Times – who had compiled a dossier based on eyewitness accounts – the attackers were ostensibly in paramilitary uniform, casting doubt on the official Chinese version of the incident, which had labelled it a “terrorist incident”.

The attack had come a week after a group calling itself the Turkistan Islamic Party took credit for a number of several sporadic terrorist attacks, including two bus explosions in Yunnan province.

The Han population there has risen from a mere 5% in the 1940s to 40%, today. The Chinese government anxious to combat both separatists and terrorists in its western province is known to have raided an alleged ETIM training camp in January 2007, killing eighteen and arresting up to twenty. China continues to monitor religious activity in the region in an attempt to curb, if not curtail, religious leaders from spreading separatist views. Since 9/11, China has continued to raise international awareness of Uighur-related terrorism and linked its actions to the Bush administration’s so-called “war on terror”.

Many experts, though, say China is exaggerating the danger posed by Uighur terrorists. They point to the fact that ETIM attacks are rather spontaneous and disorganised, resembling forms of civil unrest; they say, too, that ETIM has no effective ties to al-Qaeda and even have gone as far as concluding that the organisation may even be defunct. In a 2008 report, Amnesty International accused China of using the war on terror to justify “harsh repression” of ethnic Uighurs. However, in Xinhua (a state-run newspaper), many Chinese rights organisations refuted the Amnesty report, saying it was designed to “slander China under the pretence of human rights”.

Experts also disagree on the effectiveness and worth of China’s counterterrorism measures. Some have cited China’s anti-separatist campaign provoking more resentment, and hence more terrorism. But, in countering that view, a review of U.S. State Department documents actually shows a decrease in Uighur-related terrorism since the end of the 1990s.

 

NEIGHBOURHOOD

Xinjiang shares its border with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the “Tibet Autonomous Region”. Uighurs’ cultural links with many of its neighbours are well established raising suspicions in China that Central Asian states might back a separatist movement in Xinjiang. These fears are fuelled by the fact that the Soviet Union successfully backed a Uighur separatist movement in the 1940s. In preventing trouble fomenting within Xinjiang, China has worked hard in cultivating close diplomatic ties with its neighbours, most notably its efforts through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Essentially, this organisation was created in support of Central Asian states. It also exists to prevent any emergence of linkages between Uighur communities in these countries and Xinjiang.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that China’s diplomatic efforts have been successful. Many of China’s neighbours are now known to fight their own Muslim fundamentalist groups, making them more sympathetic to China’s plight. According to the U.S. State Department, Uzbekistan extradited a Canadian citizen of Uighur ethnicity to China in August 2006, where he was convicted for alleged involvement in ETIM activities. A Case such as this is clear evidence that China’s neighbours are co-operating with China’s anti-secessionist policies.

None of China’s neighbours, however, have expressed official support for the Uighurs; the region’s open and porous borders still worry Chinese officials. In the 1980s and 1990s, many ethnic Uighurs travelled into Pakistan and Afghanistan where they were exposed and indoctrinated to Islamic extremism. Some for example enrolled in madrassas (Islamic religious schools and training camps), some enrolled directly with the Taliban, whilst others enrolled with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. China worries that militants who slip in and out of Xinjiang can promote anti-state activity.

 

INTERNATIONAL APATHY

In the run up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008, protests in Tibet reaped international attention. Protests in Xinjiang, at the same time, went relatively unnoticed, despite it often being referred as “China’s other Tibet.”

International interest in Xinjiang is muted for a variety of reasons. For a start, the Uighur community lacks an effective leader of the stature that is held by the Dalai Lama. With the Chinese government effectively branding Uighur separatists as terrorists, this has largely reduced international sympathy for their mission. Amidst international apathy, many commentators say the human rights situation in Xinjiang is likely to get much worse before it gets better. With there being no international pressure to change policy in Xinjiang, why would China make any involuntary changes?

 

© Mark Dowe 2009: all rights protected

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