(Intelligence Briefing) Afghanistan: ‘Taliban objectives?’…

HELMAND

From the desk of MD

OFTEN, commentators seem imbued with the ideology that western forces occupying Afghanistan will continue to escalate the tensions being felt inside the country. The Taleban, it is said, are on a mission to regain control of Afghanistan after re-taking vast swathes of territory in both the south and west. It meets, though, with a tough resistance in Helmand province where the bulk of the British are based. Helmand is lucrative and fertile ground because it contains large areas of land by which the opium crop is grown and harvested; a drug which will always sell well both internally and internationally. 95% of opium reaching London, for example, originated from Afghanistan. Most, if not all of that, is bootleg trade.

Analysts, of course, are right to highlight major areas of attrition, particularly where the lives of many of our own troops are at stake. Journalism has a duty to report fairly and accurately in the public interest. But, what is also surfacing is a perception that the Taleban and its tribal intermediaries are becoming war weary: local Afghan communities are desperate in finding ways to escape a war that is seemingly without end.

 

HELMAND PROVINCE is on the brink of yet another bloody summer of fighting. According to Commander Mansoor, a powerfully built mid-level Taleban commander from southern Helmand, moderate elements of the regime are seeking peace. At a meeting with the Times, last month, he uttered words that are likely to anger hardliners who seem intent in maintaining the war against the west. In a disarmingly soft voice, Commander Mansoor said:

… We all want peace. We want to put down our guns.

As the conflict is about to enter its eighth summer, NATO is hoping to exploit such disillusion. Mansoor insists that local people do not like the Taliban, equally as much as they reject Western forces on their soil. Talibanisation has come to take on a localised meaning in Helmand, as tribal warlords have dug deep in wrestling territory and power from the grip of the west. According to Mansoor’s account local people have said to him that ‘if you want to go to Paradise then fight in the desert, fight in the mountains but don’t fight in my house’. Local people are anxious that peace and security be restored to their areas.

Difficult as it is to assess the prevalence of such feelings within the Taliban further afield, there are signs, however, that the insurgency is suffering internal turmoil brought on by opposition from local communities who blame all sides for the relentless fighting which last year alone witnessed more than 2,000 civilian deaths.

A tribal elder linked to Mullah Mansoor said that ten villages were ready to support him if he was able to broker a deal with the Afghan Government. Bringing peace to local communities seems a pressing priority. Mansoor insists that his life is on the line by attempting to deliver a deal. Invoking that Taliban hardliners will attack him and his supporters if any attempt at appeasement is made, he counters that to some extent by indicating the number of people and guns he has on his side.

 

LOCAL COMMUNITIES are also terrified by the prospect of US reinforcements through the Afghanistan “surge” yet to make its full impact felt. President Obama remains committed in seeing through the Afghanistan mission to a successful conclusion despite the fears and anxieties of local people that an increase in fighting will cause. Some local Afghans have even petitioned the Helmand Governor, promising to keep out the Taliban themselves if Western forces promise not to conduct operations in their areas. However, allied forces should be wary of such claims because this might suggest a tactic in protecting the local drugs trade or even to buy local insurgents respite from attack.

Such offers have echoes of the “Musa Qala deal” of 2006 in which British troops withdrew after receiving assurances that local tribes and clansmen would prevent the Taleban from taking control; that deal was opposed by the United States and failed after four months, with the Taliban seizing the town.

Since that deal there have been persistent reports that the Taliban is worried that its credibility is being damaged, not just by the anarchy and violence the war has unleashed but also by charges of criminal behaviour. Mansoor is documented as stating:

… There is a very big increase in the number of criminals in the Taliban in Helmand.

… When someone grows poppy and the Government tries to stop him he says ‘I am a Taleb, you can’t touch me’. When he is a robber he says ‘I am a Taleb, you can’t touch me’; when he kills someone he says ‘I am a Taleb, you can’t touch me’.

Yet, a charge of criminal behaviour undermines greatly the Taliban’s strongest suit: its reputation for bringing security and impartial, if brutal, justice.

 

IN LINE WITH SOME ANALYSTS, this site holds the position that NATO could make significant gains by playing on such concerns.

Britain and the United States have both publicly stated their continued support in recent weeks for attempts to peel away what are regarded as moderate elements within the insurgency but, practically, it is not that clear how that might be achieved. Hamid Karzai, the Afghan President, had recently called moderate elements of the Taliban to the negotiating table only for that to be rejected. At some stage it is imperative that Taliban representatives are brought to the negotiating table in deciding how best the country moves forward. The Taliban insists it will not enter negotiation so long as foreign forces remain in the country; the West, meanwhile, sits tight in Afghanistan in the strongly held belief that by doing so will stabilise the Middle East, and beyond.

The greatest obstacle for the West and NATO to overcome is the decentralised nature of the Taleban. In Helmand, though, the British Government is supporting a shift towards a bottom-up approach to local government that seeks to empower local tribal leaders. With British support the “Afghan social outreach programme” has recently created paid councils of local elders in the Nad Ali and Garmser districts of Helmand. British diplomats often talk about the “grassroots legitimacy” that these structures have quickly acquired.

It is part of a significant, if not wider, refocusing away from the previously pursued strong central government model, which has historically been beset by incompetence and endemic corruption. The early signs of the new approach in southern Helmand offer some encouragement: Garmser has now become the most stable district in the province, with local people there appearing much happier as they see and identify with progress.

In Wardak province, further north, US forces are supporting the development of village defence forces, as military commanders on the ground look for a way to replicate the impact of the “Sons of Iraq” militias that radically altered the power of Iraq’s insurgency.

But, of concern, is recent comments made by the US envoy to the region, Richard Holbrooke, who complained that Western intelligence services were “still ignorant of the inner workings of the insurgency”.

 

THE TALEBAN is conscious of a need to work in countering the damage to its reputation caused by indiscipline with its ranks. In January, for instance, the movement conducted a reshuffle of its shadow government provincial governors. It seems highly likely that the leadership has even carried out a series of retributions against some Taliban commanders for being criminal.

Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, a former Taliban minister, says there is no justice as there is no control over the Taleban. Regarded as one of the movement’s few serious intellectuals he says the current impasse is much worse than 1994 when Afghanistan collapsed into factional anarchy. 

Figures such as Mullah Mansoor who has lost all enthusiasm for staying within the Taliban says that all local people want is a commitment to reconstruction of the area, but that is being prohibited by Taleban commanders who refuse to allow it to proceed. Locals ask that the Taliban leave so as they can form their own government.

… Local Afghan communities are desperate in finding ways to escape a war that is seemingly without end.

 

Breaking the Taleban…

. 4,500 Taliban insurgents defected between 2005 and 2008

. 95% of Local Afghans want reconciliation if they can be assured of security, according to the Governor of Musa Qala.

. According to estimates given at the end of 2008, there are now between 7,000-11,000 insurgents in total.

. 5% are hardcore fundamentalists.

. 25% are deemed as uncertain or wavering in the commitment to the Taleban cause.

. 70% are fighting for the wage alone.

. $8 a day is paid to Taleban foot-soldiers.

  

© Mark Dowe 2009: all rights protected

mark.dowe@googlemail.com

 

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