Intelligence Briefing: ‘A strategy against the Taliban’…

STRATEGY

From the desk of MD

QUITE CLEARLY, regular intelligence reports suggest that the West’s war with the Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be won inside the confines or borders of Afghanistan, alone. So long as the “semi-autonomous” badlands of Pakistan’s tribal areas provide refuge and safe haven for terrorists, Afghanistan – or the wider world – will never come to know security or stability in the region. A lasting settlement must also meet with the wishes of other countries in the region that, undoubtedly, have vested interests of sorts: Iran, India and Russia.

Encouraging, then, to note that President Obama’s administration is promulgating a “regional” approach, with the White House appointing senior diplomat Richard Holbrooke, as envoy to “AfPak”. Mr. Obama’s decision to continue with the American build-up in Afghanistan, with a further 17,000 troops to arrive shortly, is a sign of how the country continues to deteriorate.

The great difficulty in dealing with this war is the real risk of a calamitous strategic defeat; the “Talibanisation” of Pakistan, an Islamic country of some 170 million people that already has in its possession a nuclear arsenal. “Victory”, a term the U.S. has often used, is less descriptive and more modest now than when the West first arrived on Afghan soil, more than 6-years ago.

Map Image Credit: Economist, 19 February 2009

But, according to the Economist, further radicalisation of Pakistan remains a distant prospect; the danger of Pakistan failing as a state, it says, is often overstated. It cites the government’s writ running in parts of the country where most people live – the vast majority of those people having moderate views. Such arguments are backed up when considering how people vote, they unambiguously reject Islamist parties. Pakistan’s election, last year, that saw the removal of Pervez Musharraf, restored to some degree the country’s fragile democracy. Though notorious for bribery and corruption, Pakistan’s civilian politicians have usually performed better than the military in resisting extreme elements. President Asif Zardari and Yusuf Raza Gilani, the prime minister, must be afforded patience by the West, in carrying out further progress that is needed. The alternative option, military rule, is what brought Pakistan into the current mess it has found itself in.

…America needs to show more patience-and more delicacy-on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border [Economist, 19 Feb 2009]

Yet, even if it may seem that the Talibanisation of Pakistan is some way off, the danger the fundamentalists represent shouldn’t be understated either. Geopolitically, the Taliban has a strong grip posing significant risks in the Pushtun (North West Pakistan) borderlands of Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The greatest danger exists, though, where the disputed border blurs between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

 

ISLAMIST ELEMENTS are certainly present, though, throughout Pakistan. A recent beheading of a Polish engineer not far from Islamabad is testament to that. Earlier this month, too, the government negotiated a truce in the Swat Valley, a region that has experienced surging Islamist support in recent months, agreeing to adopt sharia law, but an area that was once a famous tourist spot. Many see Pakistan as still remaining half-hearted in its willingness to fight Pushtun militants. A part of Pakistan’s Government, including those attached to the states intelligence service (ISI), have always seen the Afghan Taliban as a “strategic asset”, one that complements Al-Qaeda operatives – insurance against India’s ambitions and against NATO’s inevitable withdrawal.

Making up for Pakistan’s lack of commitment and enthusiasm for this ongoing struggle, U.S. forces in Afghanistan are continuing the former strategy of increasing the number of unmanned air raids (UAVs) and drones in Pakistan. Whilst the mountainous and rugged terrain of Afghanistan poses a setback for the overall efficiency of drones, a number of recent raids appear to have been highly successful in killing Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects. However, whatever short-term battlefield advantage the raids bring pales in comparison with the long-term danger posed by the ubiquitous resentment they cause: a generation of impoverished young Muslims growing up in Pakistan who feel intimidated and threatened by the continued American air assault on one side, and by the fanatical Islamist propaganda on the other. Stopping the cross-border attacks must be a strategy that Mr. Obama must consider because it is essentially a misconceived tactic. Continued use of UAVs, in the manner by which they have been used of late, will only validate an increase in anger and uprising.

It is being suggested that Mr. Obama may be tempted to take the “regional” scope of the conflict further. Arguably, in the view of many western politicians and commentators, victory in Afghanistan might depend on resolving issues such as the disputed Afghan-Pakistan border or the dispute over Kashmir between Pakistan and India, which is a continued source of grievance to many. Yet, to embroil the war in Afghanistan with the settlement of such intractable disputes could well give rise to an excuse of prevarication. Hardly what the west needs given an already heavy military commitment in Afghanistan.

As mentioned previously, when writing on Afghanistan, the war will only be won (if at all), through the process of having more soldiers on the ground: increased troop mobility and mass deployment will reduce greatly the dependence and need for air strikes; a reduction in bombing sorties from the air will greatly reduce the casualty rate which, likely, would reduce tensions enormously. But, there are other pressing issues, too, such as the huge investment needed in vital development projects; the piecemeal arrangements needed between local tribes and pawnbrokers, including the Taliban, for their to be a universally acceptable solution; and, the financial aid desperately needed in Pakistan in attempting to integrate the many tribal areas, all of whom have conflicting interests.

Attribution:

• Economist, 19 Feb 2009: “Fighting the Taliban”

 

© Mark Dowe 2009: all rights protected

mark.dowe@googlemail.com

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