AN ALLIANCE THAT SHOULD MOVE FORWARD
BETWEEN President-elect Barack Obama’s administration team coming to office in America on January 20, and the next NATO summit in Strasbourg in April, lie a few short hazardous and perilous months. Since the conflict in Georgia, this summer, NATO has seemed reluctant to identify Russia as a military threat. The Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General John Craddock, an American, is though behind the scenes engaged in prudent planning granting him a great deal of military and political muscle without the need in seeking authority from the North Atlantic Council, in an attempt to strengthen, further, the alliance.
Countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia worry that pushing too hard for formal contingency planning might be vetoed by the Russia-friendly countries in NATO. For that to happen would be a disaster: equally, it has to be recognised that the situation inside the alliance is far from stable; faced with a revisionist, and perhaps an increasingly desperate Kremlin, NATO’s credibility could do with a major boost.
President Obama’s administration must decide between how much it wants to try and calm Russia – something that will certainly please Germany and other key allies, because of economic concerns such as the supply of Russian oil to Europe – and how much it wants to publicly reinforce the security of the twitchy, strong Atlanticist countries throughout Europe’s eastern periphery. Such countries are valued allies in providing resources in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Whilst contingencies and resources provided by eastern European countries may be small in numbers, the symbolism is a strong one and a basis by which NATO may build in the future.
Reforming NATO is essential for the security of the world
The issue will hardly be lubricated by money. Some countries might argue, or even boast, that defence spending as a share of GDP has increased. But, that will more than likely be due to GDP going down, not because more cash is being allocated for military equipment and hardware.
NATO must consider, too, the credible new question of whether it should create the post of NATO secretary-general, a powerful idea that might co-ordinate better NATO’s ailing mission.
Articulating a way forward for the alliance is more than possible but it requires strength in capacity and a willingness to show that it means business. For example, it could create and launch a series of new arms-control initiatives to show the Kremlin that both NATO and the United States are taking Russia’s new image seriously. Arms-control initiatives such as discussions on START 3, which covers strategic nuclear weapons where Russia’s arsenal is already deemed weak and obsolete; on anti-ballistic missile systems such as re-visiting the European Defence Shield; or, on weapons in space.
Contentiously, for Britain and America, a second element might be to drop explicit dialogue of Georgian and Ukraine’s membership to NATO and concentrate, specifically, on building up tedious and less glamorous capabilities such as policing arms sales, storage of ammunition, training, planning and how reservists might be better managed in the future. Such reforms amongst NATO members could well lead to an acceptance of prospective new members in the future as NATO reverts to a mission that is far different from what has been expected of it in the past. Nations wishing to aspire to join NATO must meet strict legal, political and economic tests before being granted entry to the alliance, an issue that, arguably, might be seen as being currently diluted when NATO is in dire need of support from almost anywhere. Building for the future requires a proactive strategy, now, not a relaxation of rules or an acceptance that NATO is a finished article.
Yet, crucially, NATO’s original mission, “territorial defence of its existing members”, should be in no-doubt, either, as the alliance attempts to bridge new challenges whilst keeping its founding articles firmly embedded to its core. To hold fast to its original principles means sending forces on expeditionary missions. This might mean sending resources to Darfur or Somalia, areas of extreme danger to which NATO has had little or no collaborative task in the past. Critically, an alliance that is better regulated and administered for tasks being asked of it must make sure that the right forces, properly trained and equipped from all of its member nations, are available if needed.
For NATO to be fully effective it needs to be realistic, too, about what it can and cannot do. Of note it should perhaps endorse the burgeoning Swedish-Finish-Norwegian defence partnership operating in the Baltic Sea which is providing adequate relief for NATO which, otherwise, would have further stretched NATO’s scarce resources even more.
Related:
- Guardian (17 December 2008), Conor Foley: “Keeping watch in Georgia“
… The EU’s mission to monitor the post-conflict situation in Georgia is a big test of its ’soft power’ policy.
© Mark Dowe 2008: all rights protected
The writer is a management accountant by profession, also holding an M.Sc in Geography and former pupil of Professor John Struthers.
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Filed under: European Union, barack obama, nato | Tagged: arms control, baltic sea, darfur, european defence shield, general john craddock, Georgia, intelligence briefing, membership of nato, military deployments, nato, nato secretary-general, nuclear weapons, russia, russian oil market, somali, start 3, strasbourg, swedish finish norwegian defence partnership, the future of nato, Ukraine
