LOGISTICS & UNDERFUNDING

From the desk of MD
THIS WEEK, the Iraq Inquiry, was told that, in the run-up to the invasion, armed forces were starved of cash.
Former Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, and the first Cabinet Minister in post at the time of the invasion to appear before the official inquiry, said the forces’ budget was underfunded for years prior to the war and had to rely on efficiency savings.
As a result, he said, the Ministry of Defence had to buy much of the equipment needed at the last minute through the system of “urgent operational requirements” (UORs).
Related:
But Prime Minister Tony Blair, whose presence at the inquiry will be made shortly, refused to allow active preparations for war to begin until just five months before the invasion was launched because he did not want to undermine diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis through the United Nations.

Subsequently, some kit – such as desert combat fatigues and desert boots – failed to reach the front line in time for the start of the war in March 2003.
…Some got to theatre in time, some did not … There were certainly complaints about desert combats. Quite a lot of soldiers went into action in green combats and they didn’t like it … some soldiers did not have the right boots.
Mr. Hoon said that when he became defence secretary in 1999 there was a belief in the MoD that they had not received the cash they needed to fund the 1998 strategic defence review.
When he pressed the Treasury for additional funding, he was rebuffed.
…There was quite a strong feeling that it was not fully funded. Part of the way it was funded was by a commitment to serious efficiencies to the way existing equipment was used to release cash for some of the new acquisitions.
…I think everyone accepted that was a pretty challenging target.
…Certainly, in subsequent CSR (comprehensive spending review) programmes we asked for significantly more money than we eventually received.
Mr. Hoon said the MoD had to submit a list of UORs to the Treasury, which was finally approved on October 4, 2002.
By that time he and the chief of the defence staff, Admiral Lord Boyce, were becoming concerned that Mr. Blair had still not decided whether he wanted to deploy an Army division in support of the Americans, which would normally take six months to prepare for.
When they tried to press the PM for a decision so they could begin the necessary preparations, Mr. Hoon said they were told to “calm down”.
…When we went to meetings saying, ‘Look, you need to get on with this’, we were told ‘Calm down, you can’t get on with it while the diplomatic process is under way’.
… The argument I was given very clearly from the PM and the Foreign Secretary (Jack Straw) was that if we were seen to be overtly preparing for war, that would affect our ability to secure a UN Security Council resolution.
… Mike (Lord Boyce) and I went to meetings in September where we were both made very well aware of the attitude in Downing Street towards the requirements for minimising publicity and avoiding visibility of preparations.
… There was no doubt of the fact that we could not go out overtly and prepare.
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Mr. Hoon admitted that some British troops in Iraq were left without enhanced combat body armour because of problems in tracking the distribution of equipment.
Some military units were given double the required sets of armour and some were provided with none, he said.
… Something like 36,000 sets were shipped to Iraq. From the lessons-learned process afterwards, one of the problems was that there was not a very effective tracking system once the containers were unloaded.
… I suspect probably what happened was that some units ended up with two lots of everything, and some units ended up with nothing. So the distribution on the ground in Iraq was not satisfactory.
Mr. Hoon told the inquiry he was told in September 2002 that enough enhanced combat body armour was available for all frontline forces.
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INNER CIRCLE
GORDON BROWN, yesterday, said he had written to the chairman of the Iraq Inquiry, Sir John Chilcot, saying he would be happy to give evidence at “any time”.
The Prime Minister told MPs in the Commons of his letter as pressure mounted on him to give evidence ahead of the General Election, which must be held by June.
Mr. Brown said he would take direction from Sir John about when to appear.
Demands have been growing on the Prime Minister after he was accused of starving the armed forces of essential and much needed funds.
As noted, former defence secretary, Geoff Hoon, told the inquiry earlier this week that the Treasury, under Mr. Brown as Chancellor, failed to fund the forces properly in the years before the conflict and slashed their budget after the invasion.
At Prime Minister’s Question Time (PMQs), SNP Westminster leader Angus Robertson said:
… The Chilcot Inquiry has heard that you were in the Iraq War inner circle and refused key payments for our troops on the frontline.
… Will you confirm that there is no impediment for you to seek a time to give evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry before the General Election?
Mr. Brown replied:
… This is, as I said, a matter for the Chilcot Inquiry. I have written to Sir John Chilcot and I have said to him that I am happy to give evidence at any time. I will take whatever advice he gives me about when he wishes me to appear.
… I am happy to give evidence about all the issues he puts forward and I am happy to satisfy the public about our Government’s commitment to the security of this country.
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Last week Mr. Brown insisted he had “nothing to hide” after Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg said the public were entitled to know before polling day of his role in the Government’s “most disastrous decision”.
Sir John has indicated hearings will not be held in the election run-up to allow the inquiry to stay outside party politics.
Former Number 10 spin doctor Alastair Campbell told the inquiry last week that Mr. Brown, who was then chancellor, was part of the “inner circle” of ministers and advisers Tony Blair consulted in private on Iraq.
And Mr. Hoon said this week that orders for vital new equipment – including helicopters which could have been used in the current conflict in Afghanistan – had to be cancelled as a result of Treasury cost-cutting.
Shadow foreign secretary William Hague said he hoped Mr. Brown’s letter would lead to the Prime Minister giving evidence before the General Election.
Mr. Clegg said:
… Gordon Brown must insist, on behalf of the British people, he appears at the inquiry before the election.
Meanwhile, the inquiry has also been told the claim that Saddam Hussein could launch weapons of mass destruction in 45-minutes was included to add “local colour” to the Government’s notorious Iraq dossier.
Sir David Omand, who was the Government’s security and intelligence co-ordinator, said that the way the dossier was produced to “make a case” for military action was a “big mistake”.
He said Tony Blair should not have been allowed to state in his foreword to the document that intelligence had shown “beyond doubt” that Iraq had WMD.
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DIFFICULT
Jack Straw: ‘Invasion was my most difficult decision’
JACK STRAW stands accused of being “desperate” to distance himself from Tony Blair’s view that he would have sought to remove Saddam Hussein from power whatever it took.
Mr. Straw, the UK Justice Secretary – the first serving Cabinet minister to give evidence to the Iraq Inquiry – admitted that backing the invasion had been the “most difficult decision” of his life.
The minister, who was Foreign Secretary at the time, explained how, from when the former Prime Minister met George W Bush at the US President’s Texas ranch in April 2002, he had made clear Britain could not join a US-led military invasion without a proper UN mandate.
He said he was clear the American policy of regime change was “improper and self-evidently unlawful” and he would not have gone along with it.
Last month, however, Mr. Blair revealed how he would have sought to have taken Britain to war with Iraq even if had known there were no weapons of mass destruction. The then Prime Minister, who will give his evidence in 7-days time, made clear he would have simply used different arguments to justify it.
Mr. Straw, who appeared before the Chilcot Inquiry, Thursday 21 January, repeatedly appeared to suggest his views were at odds with Mr. Blair’s, saying while he owed the former PM his loyalty, they were “two different people”.
Asked to what degree his views differed from the ex-PM’s, the Secretary of State said the inquiry would have to ask Mr. Blair that. He also appeared to distance himself from letters written by Mr. Blair to Mr. Bush, in which – according to Alastair Campbell – he promised Britain would “be there” if it came to military action.
Questioned about one critical note that the ex-PM sent in July 2002, Mr. Straw said: “Would I have written the memorandum in the same way? Probably not because I am a different person.”
The Justice Secretary said he had “very reluctantly” come round to supporting the invasion but stressed how the case for action against Iraq was not based “on intelligence alone” but also on factors like Saddam’s history of using WMD and his defiance of the UN.
He admitted the claim in the Government’s deeply contentious intelligence document of September 2002, which, among other things, claimed Iraq’s WMD could be used within 45-minutes, had been “an error that has haunted us ever since”.
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Mr. Straw revealed that he had presented Mr. Blair on the eve of the crunch Commons vote with an alternative plan should it have been lost. This included offering the Americans intelligence, logistical support and the use of the airbase on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.
In a written statement to the inquiry panel, the Secretary of State pointed out how, as Foreign Secretary, his support for military action was crucial to the commitment of British troops.
… If I had refused that, the UK’s participation in the action would not have been possible. There would almost certainly have been no majority in Cabinet or in the Commons.
Ed Davy for the LibDems said Mr. Straw’s insistence that he used his “judgement” rather than solid proof of the existence of WMD was a weak defence of his role.
Mr. Davy added:
… It is clear he is desperate to distance himself from Tony Blair’s unrepentant belief he would have got rid of Saddam Hussein whatever it took.
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OPINION
THE INQUIRY into the Iraq War chaired by Sir John Chilcot has laboured under the charge it would become another whitewash, ever since the inquiry was announced. Sir John, who was perhaps stung by that criticism, gave swift notice of the seriousness by which he took his latest appointment. John Chilcot, a former civil servant, whose retirement from the civil service has been spent as a board member or chair of a long list of public bodies, insists that evidence should be heard in public, with an exception for secret intelligence. That stance differs substantially from other inquiries held into the Iraq war.
That was an important first step towards public accountability. Nonetheless, there is reasonable currency in the view that this inquiry will not add significantly to what we already know from the Hutton inquiry into the issues surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly, the government scientist who apparently committed suicide, and the Butler inquiry which examined the intelligence used to justify the war.
That is why it is imperative that the members of the inner circle which collectively made the decision to go to war in 2003, especially Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, are subjected to close forensic and public questioning while the accounts of others involved, such as senior civil servants and members of the Cabinet, are still fresh in the memory.
Mr. Brown’s offer, late last week, to appear before the inquiry in advance of the General Election is welcome, even if it has been prompted by a calculation that it will be in his political interests to do so. The claims of Geoff Hoon, that the Treasury under Gordon Brown failed to fund the forces properly in the years before the conflict and then slashed the defence budget following the invasion, leaves the Prime Minister as the chief target for public anger over the failure to fully equip troops on the ground and provide sufficient helicopter back-up. Better helicopter support would have spared countless British lives that have instead been lost to ground incendiary devices.
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THE CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE from Sir Nicholas Macpherson, who was permanent secretary at the Treasury, that no request for essential military equipment for the 2003 invasion was turned down and that there had been an increase in MoD spending in 2002, adds confusion rather than clarity and adds impetus towards hearing Mr. Brown’s account.
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SIR JOHN CHILCOT had originally envisaged that calling current cabinet members, in key roles, be delayed until after the election. His justifiable concern was that party politics might obfuscate the real issues requiring to be addressed. Care can be taken to avoid that by, for example, asking the right types of questions. The public has a right to know before polling day how the crucial decisions were made and on what basis Britain invaded Iraq.
Gordon Brown claims that he “has nothing to hide”. On that basis, then, he must be prepared
to give a full and honest account of the part he played, not only as Chancellor but as a member of that inner circle. It is an opportunity to put the rec
ord straight, once and for all.
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Des Browne, former defence secretary, admits concerns raised on helicopter numbers:

DES BROWNE, who was defence secretary between May 2006 and October 2008, appearing before the Chilcot Inquiry, said concerns were raised over the number of helicopters available to British forces even before the UK expanded its mission in Afghanistan.
Mr. Browne said that being able to move troops by air became even more important as the nature of the threat changed “dramatically”.
He said, though, that he did not “necessarily” accept that the shortage of helicopters led to greater use of lightly-armoured Snatch Land Rovers. He also admitted he found it difficult to come to terms with the deaths of British troops in Iraq.
Appearing before Sir John Chilcot, Monday, 25 January, he told the inquiry he had only been in the job for 24-hours when a Lynx helicopter was shot down over Basra, killing five UK personnel. He said:
…I hadn’t the benefit of military experience, which helps people to cope. I think at the strategic level I found it difficult personally to deal with the losses of our people in the operational theatre.
…I became focused, I think rightly, on our people and their families and on our support for them during the time that I had this awesome responsibility.
Inquiry panel member, Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, asked Mr. Browne: “Would you accept that even before the commitments to Afghanistan, there was concern being expressed that we didn’t have enough helicopters to perform the military tasks that we had set for ourselves?”
Mr. Browne replied:
…Yes, there was concern being expressed.
… I recognised the increasing importance of helicopters from the point of view of secure transport.
… The more the nature of the risk adapted and changed – and it changed quite dramatically in the time that I was secretary of state – the more important it became for us to be able to move in the air.
A total of 179 British personnel died between the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and the end of combat operations in April 2009.
Opposition politicians and families of troops killed in Snatch Land Rovers have criticised the use of the vehicles and questioned why more helicopters were not made available.
Mr. Browne said he and the Ministry of Defence made great efforts to get extra helicopters but it took time for them to be ready for use. John Hutton, who succeeded Mr. Browne as defence secretary, agreed that the shortage of helicopters had an impact on British operations in Iraq. He told the inquiry:
…The issue of helicopters was a factor in the campaign, and I don’t think there’s any point pretending otherwise.
…The military would certainly have liked more helicopters, and I think the politicians would have liked to have made them available – and did over a number of years make more helicopter ‘hours’ available.
…This is not a capability you can simply buy one day and the next day you’ve got it. It’s not like that.
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- Wednesday, 27 January 2010
Jack Straw rejected advice on invasion. Contradiction of earlier evidence.
THE CHILCOT INQUIRY heard that Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary at the time Britain invaded Iraq, rejected the advice of his chief legal adviser that invading Iraq would be a “crime of aggression”.
Sir Michael Wood said he informed Mr. Straw that the invasion would be aggressive without a UN Security Council Resolution specifically authorising military action.
Sir Michael’s evidence contradicted evidence given by Jack Straw, last week, when the former foreign secretary said he had assured his opposite number in the U.S. that he was “entirely comfortable” with making the case for war.
The inquiry also heard that Downing Street had raised the prospect of going into Iraq to break up Saddam Hussein’s regime without “international legal authority” for the use of force. Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, was warned two months before the invasion that it would be illegal to go to war without United Nations authority.
Newly declassified Government documents showed the Attorney General at the time, Lord Goldsmith, was initially “pessimistic” that there was sufficient legal basis for military action.
Mr. Straw, however, urged Lord Goldsmith to change his view, warning against overtly “dogmatic legal advice”. The Attorney General eventually ruled the invasion of Iraq was lawful.
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EVEN while the negotiations were underway in October 2002 on Security Council Resolution 1441, which required Iraq to give up its supposed weapons of mass destruction, Sir Michael said he was being asked about the consequences of invading without legal authority:
…This was a rather curious request and I am still not entirely sure what the purpose was. I think it was to send off to No. 10 and it did go to No. 10, who said: ‘why has this been put in writing?’ is my recollection.
Following the passing of 1441 in November 2002, Lord Goldsmith expressed concern to Mr. Straw that it was being seen in Government as the legal justification for military action.
A note of a telephone conversation between the two men on November 12 recorded:
…The attorney had mentioned the ‘Chinese whispers’ that had come to his attention in this regard, which suggested that he took an optimistic view of the legal position that would obtain if such a situation arose, whereas he was in fact pessimistic as to whether there would be a sound legal basis in such a situation for the use of force against Iraq.
Lord Goldsmith added that Jonathan Powell, Mr. Blair’s chief of staff, had indicated that No. 10 was “under no illusion” as to his views on the issue.
Sir Michael Wood said initially it was made clear that he should not come down on one side or the other, but in January 2003 he took issue with Mr. Straw over his assertion that it would still be possible to take action, even if they failed to get a second resolution authorising war. In a memo to Jack Straw, Sir Michael wrote:
…To use force without Security Council authority would amount to a crime of aggression.
Jack Straw replied:
…I note your advice but do not accept it.
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- Thursday, 28 January 2010
GOLDSMITH

LORD GOLDSMITH gave the go-ahead, or “green-light”, to invade Iraq just two days after he had met with senior officials in George W Bush’s government, the Chilcot inquiry has heard.
The former Attorney General said that until February 2003 – one month before the military strike against Baghdad – he had warned and briefed Tony Blair, then prime minister, that ‘specific United Nations approval’ for the move would be needed before the military could go into the country.
Despite that, Lord Goldsmith changed his mind after he flew to Washington DC for talks with US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and US State Department legal adviser Will Taft:
…I did reach the view then – and still am of the opinion – that it was lawful. I stand by that advice. It was an opinion that I reached independently, having considered all the arguments and the evidence and that was my genuine view.
Lord Goldsmith added that despite having recommended that a second UN resolution would have been the “safest course”, he did not hesitate to issue a straightforward statement on the eve of invasion that military action was lawful.
He said his earlier opinion was “overly cautious” but strongly denied that he had been asked by Mr. Blair to change it.
He told the hearing he first raised his concerns about the legality of military action with Mr. Blair in July 2002 – well before the Prime Minister had talks with President Bush.
Lord Goldsmith added:
… I did it of my own volition. I wasn’t asked for it. I don’t frankly think it was terribly welcome.
When the Security Council passed resolution 1441, requiring Saddam Hussein to give up his supposed weapons of mass destruction, Lord Goldsmith said it was not a sufficient basis for the use of force.
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AS military personnel made final preparations on January 14, 2003, Lord Goldsmith presented a draft legal opinion to Mr. Blair advising him that a further Security Council resolution would be required if Britain was to join the US invasion. The Prime Minister, he said, replied: “I understand your advice is your advice.”
Lord Goldsmith added that he interpreted that as the Prime Minister’s acceptance he had to abide by his opinion.
Lord Goldsmith said a meeting with Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain’s ambassador to the UN, on January 23 helped to ‘sway his opinion’ that the wording of 1441 could in itself justify military action.
This stance appears to have cemented after talks with Mr. Taft and Ms. Rice on February 10. He said that had made it clear that President Bush’s one “red line” in the negotiations on 1441 was that they should not “concede a veto” to the French on military action, something they were adamant had not happened.
…It was hard to believe that, given what I had been told about the one red line that President Bush had, that all these experienced lawyers and negotiators in the United States could actually have stumbled into doing the one thing they had been told must not happen.
He now concluded there was a “reasonable case” for the invasion without a second UN resolution.
Earlier in his evidence, Lord Goldsmith said that he did not agree with the Government’s decision that “certain documents are not to be declassified” for the inquiry. The chairman, Sir John Chilcot, said: “We share your frustration.”
The papers and documents are thought to relate to his advice to the government. Prime Minister Gordon Brown said the inquiry would have access to all the papers, but would not necessarily make them public.
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- Tuesday, 02 February 2010
MILITARY CHIEFS
SENIOR military chiefs in Britain threatened to resign in protest at defence cuts a year after the Iraq invasion of March 2003 – the inquiry heard, Monday 01 February.
General Lord Walker of Aldringham, then head of the armed forces, said military chiefs “drew a line” halfway down a list of projects facing the axe and warned the Treasury, headed by Gordon Brown, to go no further.
Military brass at the Ministry of Defence, he said, were not happy with any of the cuts, pointing out there was a ‘38% shortfall’ in ‘helicopter availability’ at the time.
General Lord Walker also said that military commanders were “anxious” about the ‘legality’ of the Iraq war until Lord Goldsmith, then attorney general, gave clear advice that it would be lawful.
In recent days the inquiry heard evidence from former defence secretary, Geoff Hoon, that the Treasury failed to fund the forces properly in the three years before the conflict and then slashed their budget after the invasion.
General Lord Walker said things came to a head in the public spending round in early 2004, when the Treasury set military chiefs tough targets in their budget:
…There was indeed a list of stuff that we were having to make decisions about and I think we drew a line somewhere halfway down the page, and said: ‘If you go any further than that you will probably have to look for a new set of chiefs’.
The former head of the armed forces confirmed that helicopters were included in the list but were “above the line”. He said:
…It makes it sound as if we were happy with what was above the line. We weren’t happy with any of it.
The inquiry also heard that ministers were warned of a “serious risk” the military would not have all the equipment it needed to invade Iraq because of the ‘rush’ to war in 2003.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the current head of the armed forces, said:
…The problem, of course, was that we simply didn’t have enough time, as it turned out, to do everything we needed to do before the operation started.
Sir Jock said it would have made a “significant difference” if the military had been given the six months considered necessary to prepare for a large deployment; they had just four months.
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AT the time of the invasion, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup was deputy chief of the defence staff (equipment). Problems were singled out with the supply of enough combat body armour, desert combats and boots for frontline troops.
The shortage of body armour was blamed for the death of tank commander Sergeant Steven Roberts, 33, one of the first British soldiers killed in Iraq.
Voicing concerns to politicians about the tight timescale before the invasion, and given the evidence heard previously that planning for the war was hampered by concerns that public preparations could damage diplomatic negotiations, Sir Jock said:
…We made it absolutely clear to ministers that if we were not allowed to engage with industry – and that was the critical element – we could take these no further and that there was a serious risk that they would not all be delivered by the assumed start of operations.
Sir Jock admitted that military chiefs were “very nervous” about overstretching British forces when the Government decided to deploy extra troops to southern Afghanistan in January 2006.
…There was absolutely this concern about the overlap between Iraq and Afghanistan, and the doubt whether we would actually be able to reduce in Iraq quite as quickly as we were planning at that time.
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‘Gordon Brown “guillotined” Iraq budget’
THIS WEEK defence chiefs told the Chilcot inquiry that they had to cut projects for helicopters, warships and spy planes after Gordon Brown “guillotined” their budget.
The former top civil servant at the Ministry of Defence spoke of the “crisis period” when Mr. Brown as Chancellor suddenly slashed military spending six months after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Sir Kevin Tebbit said the MoD had to launch an “across-the-board major savings exercise” after the Treasury imposed “arbitrary” cuts.
He said that such sweeping cuts affected projects including helicopters, the Nimrod fleet, Royal Navy destroyers, frigates, minesweepers and patrol vessels, Challenger tanks, AS 90 artillery and RAF Jaguar aircraft. The number of Armed Forces personnel and civil servants were also reduced by the MoD.
Sir Kevin, who was MoD permanent secretary from 1998 to 2005, stressed that defence chiefs saved resources needed for Iraq but admitted that the cuts had a long-term impact:
…I was running essentially a crisis budget rather than one with sufficient resources to be able to plan as coherently, as well for the long term, as we would have liked.
This claim was also cited by Conservative leader, David Cameron, at Prime Minister Questions (PMQs) on Wednesday, which resulted in stormy exchanges in the House of Commons.
Sir Kevin hit back at the evidence of Treasury permanent secretary Sir Nicholas Macpherson that military spending was increasing by 9% a year when Mr. Brown stepped in.
Last month, Sir Nicholas told the inquiry:
…That had to be pulled back. That meant that the MoD couldn’t spend as much as it would have liked. But had it stuck to the cash figures in the original settlement, that situation wouldn’t have arisen.
Sir Kevin pointed out that in 2002 the budgets of the Department of Transport and the Department for International Development rose by 12% and 8% respectively.
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A NEWLY DECLASSIFIED document released on Wednesday 03 Feb (2010) shows that defence chiefs warned that sending extra troops to Afghanistan while the UK was still committed in Iraq would lead to “some pain and grief.”
In particular, “pinch points” involving helicopter support, specialist intelligence and medical provision would remain for longer than had been hoped, said a letter sent to former defence secretary Dr. John Reid.
Sir Kevin voiced concerns that the military would be “overstretched” if UK forces were deployed to Helmand province.
He told the inquiry:
…I was apprehensive and felt that this could be a mission too far and I made my concerns known to my planning staff and to the chiefs of staff.
But, Mr. Reid, who was defence secretary when British troops were sent to Helmand in 2006, said he believed the military could cope. He told the inquiry:
…I think we were stretched, we were taut. But my military advice is we’re not overstretched.
Mr. Reid attacked the claims of former international development secretary Clare Short that the Cabinet was not allowed to question Lord Goldsmith, then the attorney general, about his advice that the war was legal.
On Tuesday, 02 Feb, Ms. Short told the inquiry that she was “jeered at” to be quiet by other ministers when she tried to ask Lord Goldsmith a question.
John Reid said:
…Everyone was allowed to speak at these meetings. I don’t recognise some descriptions of some of the least quiescent of my colleagues claiming to have been rendered quiescent.
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- Tuesday, 09 February 2010
Jack Straw denies ignoring Iraq war legal advice

JACK STRAW hit back, yesterday, in his second appearance at the Chilcot Inquiry, at claims that he ignored legal advice that the Iraq war would be unlawful without further United Nations backing.
He insisted he gave serious attention to a warning from his former senior legal adviser, Sir Michael Wood, that the conflict would be a “crime of aggression” unless Britain achieved another UN Security Council resolution.
The Chilcot Inquiry into the war has heard that Mr Straw, who was foreign secretary at the time of the 2003 invasion, rejected Sir Michael’s advice.
But Mr Straw said in a statement to the inquiry that it would be a “fundamentally flawed” system if ministers were obliged to accept all the legal advice they received.
He wrote:
…Far from ‘ignoring’ this advice, as has been suggested publicly, I read Sir Michael’s minute with great care and gave it the serious attention it deserved…So much so that I thought I owed him a formal and personal written response rather than simply having a conversation with him.
The inquiry has heard that Sir Michael, former senior legal adviser at the Foreign Office, took issue with Mr Straw in January 2003 over his assertion in a meeting with US vice-president Dick Cheney that Britain would still be “OK” if it failed to get a second resolution.
He wrote to the then-foreign secretary in a memo:
…To use force without Security Council authority would amount to a crime of aggression.
Mr Straw replied:
…I note your advice but I do not accept it.
Sir Michael told the inquiry:
…He took the view that I was being very dogmatic and that international law was pretty vague and that he wasn’t used to people taking such a firm position.
…When he had been at the Home Office, he had often been advised things were unlawful but he had gone ahead anyway and won in the courts.
Sir Michael’s deputy, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, who resigned in protest at the war, said the Foreign Office lawyers were united in their belief of the need for a second resolution.
Mr Straw took issue with Sir Michael’s claim in his memo that there was “no doubt” that the UK could not lawfully use force against Iraq without a further Security Council decision.
He wrote in his statement:
…There was of course no doubt about the illegality of self-defence, overwhelming humanitarian necessity, or regime change per se, as a basis for military action and no one was suggesting the contrary.
…But there was doubt about the position … This was at the heart of the debate on lawfulness.
He went on:
…It would surely be a novel, and fundamentally flawed, constitutional doctrine that a minister was bound to accept any advice offered to him/her by a department’s legal adviser as determinative of an issue if there were reasonable grounds for taking a contrary view.
…Such a doctrine would wholly undermine the principle of personal ministerial responsibility and give inappropriate power to a department’s legal advisers.
Mr Straw also acknowledged none of the matters he dealt with while home secretary compared to the “potential gravity” of the decision about whether to take military action against Iraq.
Mr Straw said Sir Michael had given “contradictory” legal advice – noting in an earlier memorandum that there were two possible views on whether military action was lawful without a further Security Council resolution.
…The legal advice he offered, frankly, was contradictory and I think I was entitled to raise that.
Mr Straw acknowledged he was not an international lawyer – as Ms Wilmshurst had pointed out – but said he believed his close involvement in the negotiations which led to the passing of resolution 1441 in November 2002 meant that he was able to take a view on whether it offered sufficient authorisation for the use of force.
…Yes, I am not an international lawyer but I was able to bring something to the party, which was an intense knowledge of the negotiating history.
…My view from having been involved in the negotiations line-by-line, word-by-word, comma-by-comma, was that there was an overwhelming argument that 1441 required a second stage but not a second resolution.
He said it had always been the case that the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, would have to rule on whether military action was legal and until he did, the question would be open to doubt.
…The final decision on the lawfulness of military action was one that was going to be taken by the attorney general and the attorney general alone.
…Where I disagreed with him (Sir Michael) was that he had the right over and above the attorney general to say what was or was not lawful.
…In the absence of a decision by the attorney general, there had to be doubt. That was what I thought to be strange.
Mr Straw said negotiations for 1441 would not have been so drawn-out and hard-fought if Britain and America had not been seeking to avoid needing another resolution.
A resolution that required a further UN decision would effectively have given Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein two final chances, he told the inquiry.
Mr Straw said:
…If what we had been negotiating was a resolution which required a second resolution, the negotiations would have been over in a week.
…There has to be a reason why these negotiations began in late September and went on intensively night and day for six weeks.
…And the reason was that because of the Americans’ so-called red line, and indeed our own, that we believed that Saddam had had enough final opportunities.
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© Mark Dowe 2010: all rights protected
mark.dowe@googlemail.com
Guardian Response: ‘Landmines and cluster bombs’…
OTTAWA TREATY
Clancy Sigal writing in the Guardian, “Landmines: Obama’s ultimate betrayal”, Monday, 21 December, 2009, says:
– Clancy Sigal is an American novelist and screenwriter and a former BBC correspondent
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IN REPLY
THE ISSUE of land mines and cluster bombs is a point well made. In contrast, you will note, the Government here announced through the recent Queen’s Speech that it intends to outlaw the use of such deadly and ruthless weapons. It’s an approach I totally agree with given the unpitying nature by which cluster bombs operate. Deadly, not only in the sense of claiming the lives of many innocents, but unforgiving in the sense that explosions cannot be reckoned with. They may explode mid-air, on direct impact with the ground or, worse still, after a delayed period of time after resting idle on the ground. People can become injured, and deaths have been reported, sometimes months after the munitions were released: dirty weapons that are unjustified in any theatre of war.
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© Mark Dowe 2009: all rights protected
mark.dowe@googlemail.com
Filed under: Government, Human Rights, United Nations, United States, Westminster, World Affairs, barack obama, military | Tagged: barack obama, clancy sigal, cluster bombs, convention on cluster munitions, guardian comments, landmines, ottawa treaty | Leave a Comment »